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A Different Jihad
Dalit Muslims' Challenge to Ashraf Hegemony
This article discusses the issue of caste, in the context of the backward Muslim communities of
Bihar elucidated in'All Anwar's book, and the complete marginalisation of the groups at the
bottom of the pecking order. The book, by focusing on the plight of back\vard and dalit
Muslims, has the potential to redefine the very grammar of Muslim politics in favour of a
progressive agenda, thus moving away from the now-prevalent reactive politics.
IRFAN AHMAD
(By contrast) lowly, rascal, incompetent, coward, unknown, stingy,
lazy, lowborn, bazaari people do not have any association with
history; neither can its study be their profession...Reading and
knowing of it (history) is harmful rather than beneficial to the stingy
and lowborn people.
_ (Ziauddin Barni' 1983:47-48)
The position of the Julahas had got thoroughly undermined and
this inferior-lowly people (badzaat) were most active in the uproar
(1857 rebellion).
(Sir Syed Khan 1958:60)
Gentlemen! So long as religious knowledge was with the Sheikhs
and other nations (read castes) remained under subjugation, there
was no disaster. However, ever since qasaai, naaee, teli, lohaar
bisaati, kalaal,julaha etcetera have become maulvi.mudarris, qari,
sufi, hafiz, the wave of problems has begun to arrive because Hadis
proves that those who would believe in dajjal would verily be
julahas.2
(Ahmad Usmani quoted in Ansari 2001:30)
Introduction
A ligarh, February 12, 2002. On a pleasantly cold winter
/ \ evening, otherwise politically hot because of the upcom-
JL .Vjng UP assembly elections, I walk down to the Muslim-
populated Upper Fort neighbourhood of the old town, locally
known as Sheher. Preparations are underway for the election
meeting of G M Banatwalla, a sitting member of parliament and
a prominent leader of the Muslim League. His supporters are
enthusiastically erecting the stage adjacent to the Jama Masjid,
an imposing, magnificent, medieval mosque. For Muslims of
Sheher, the space surrounding the Jama Masjid represents, to
invoke Jürgen Habermas, a coffee house (an open one, though)
and hence a public sphere in its Indian incarnation. As dusk
draws closer and the muezzin calls out for prayer, it gradually
turns into a debating plaza where everything is discussed:
from light social gossip to serious political issues. Taking
me for a journalist, a group of young men walk towards me.
I introduce myself. And then discussion takes off, mostly about
elections.
The most vocal among the youth remarks, "Muslims are facing
the toughest time now and this election would be really decisive."
In a tone marked by deep lament, he adds that Muslims in Sheher
are not united: 'Musalmanon men iteehad nahi hai; aapas me
hi tafarqa hai' (Muslims are not united, they are divided among
themselves). There are four Muslim candidates belonging to
different castes. And their respective supporters will only vote
for their own caste candidates, no matter whether this leads to
the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party.
"Casteism", he goes on, " has deeply also crept into Muslims.
They do not act like a 'millat'. We were united before, but
especially after 1990 caste divisions have grown stronger among
Muslims. Prior to 1990 we used to fight elections collectively.
All Muslims used to vote for one Muslim candidate. But ever
since the rise of casteism, we have often lost (except in the last
election when a candidate belonging to the qureshi community
got elected to the state assembly) and BJP has won instead. They
(low-castes) are indeed 'jahil', ignorant".
Denial and Anxiety
The upper castes comprise no more than 8 per cent of the total
population. The majority of Muslims in Sheher are qureshis,
ansaris, saifis, rangrez, bishtis or alvis. Before 1990, candidates
were often from the so-called Ashraf classes and Muslims in
general supported them. But after 1990, that is, since what
Yogender Yadav has described as the 'second democratic up-
surge' [1996:101] inaugurated by Mandai and the ascendance
of the other backward classes·1 (OBCs), low-caste Muslims
started putting up their own candidates and asked the Ashraf to
vote for them. In the narrative of the upper castes, it was then
that casteism began within Muslims and the imagined millat got
severely wounded.
Such an impression, as given to me by my young friend, a Khan
by caste and whose father had migrated from an erstwhile princely
state to the town some three decades ago, is most common among
the Muslims elites.4 However, this is not unique to Muslims.
Upper caste Hindus too hold the same opinion [Goradia 2001].
As a matter of fact, the classes in power and with privileges have
always dismissed resistance to them as a ploy to sow the seeds
of disunity, now in the name of nation now in the name of
community, both of which are more imagined than real. The
dismissal is accomplished by a variety of strategies. I will focus
here only on two important strategies.
The first, and also the most effective one, is by denying the
very existence of the problem.5 A characteristic example in th i s
regard is the response one often encounters from the diasporic
Pakistanis in the west. Ask any of them about the presence of
castes among Muslims, her immediate and most l ikely reply is
'no'.6 The naïve assumption behind this denial is that Islam does
not sanction caste system. And if there is one, it was a Hindu
influence that has disappeared after'Islamic' Pakistan was creaied.
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And those few who accept its presence feel embarrassed to
acknowledge if. 'Hindu' feature in 'Islamic nation'. But it is a
stunning reality that caste is perhaps more prominent in Pakistan
than in India. The birth certificate issued by municipal offices
in Punjab has a distinct compulsory column for caste. It is called
'qaum'.7 One certificate (issued in Circa 2000) that I examined
was issued by the Rawalpindi municipal office, and under the
column qaum was written 'Hun Rajput'. The denial by the Indian
Ashraf runs almost along the same lines even as its framing is
anchored in a markedly different political context.
The second one is by a fervent invoking of the slogan ' u n i t y
in danger' or 'conspiracy to divide the qaum/millat".8 Consider
the response of a revivalist Muslim organisation to the struggle
launched by the All IndiaMuslim OBC Organisation (AIMOBCO).
On August 29, 1996 AIMOBCO organised, under the leadership
of its convener, Shabbir Ansari, a conference in New Delhi's
Maolankar Hall. Its main objective was to build public opinion
in favour of extending the existing provision of reservation for
other backward classes to their Musl im counterparts. Barely a
week after the conference. Dawat, the biweekly Urdu organ of
the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind [JIH], front-paged an alarming story
- "Do not Create Further Disunity in Problem-Ridden Millat"
[Dawat 1996].
As JIH ideology stands, it seeks to fashion a bounded, unified,
homogenous Mulsim Qaum regardless of all its glaring social
differentiations based on caste, language, ethnicity, region, gender
and class9. No wonder, it first rejects the very existence of castes
among Muslims. However, in the same paragraph it makes a
paradoxical statement (and paradox is inherent in the ideology
of such movements) that admits the presence of caste,among
Muslims. But this is immediately dismissed saying that " now
such things (caste divisions among Muslims) are fading away".
Referring to the specific demand raised in the seminar, Dawat
sees it with absolute suspicion and as a design of some sort to
divide Muslims:
Therefore to l ink issue of reservation tocaste is akin to permanently
dividing the Muslim society along the caste lines [Souvenir of
AIMOBCO, undated: 11]
It concludes:
There is no gain in further dividing the Muslims who are already
ridden with problems [ibid: 11].
It would not be out of place here to mention that even as in
JIH's grand ideology there is no recognition of caste, sentiments,
solidarities and marital alliances based on caste do exist in
practice within its own organisation and members. It is rarely
visible and articulated in public, though. The last page of Dawat
carries matrimonials. Most of them clearly mention the caste of
the bride/groom. During my fieldwork. one of its members
narrated to me in anguish how the marriage alliance for his sister
was repeatedly turned down once it came to be known that he
was an ansari, a julaha. This was despite the fact that he was
economically well-placed. Those who declined the marriage
proposal (on the singular basis of caste) also included members
of the JIH (field notes).
Cast in this wider context, Anwar's (2001) book Masawat ki
Jang ('Battle for Equality') is a remarkable piece of work. It
brings into sharp focus the dark-lived experiences that may shame
the upholders of vacuous scriptural equality. Consisting of eight
thematic chapters, the book is about the backward Musl im
communities of Bihar. In the first chapter- 'Bahas', discussion
- the author makes a strong case for consti tutional recognition
of the reservation of non-ashraf, da l i t Muslims by countering two
popular arguments put forward by the ashraf. First, it persuasively
contends that caste among Muslims has arisen not because of
government policies of independent India; rather it has been there
for centuries. Second, it sees with suspicion the demand for
reservation for Muslims as a whole. According to the author,
the idea of 'total Muslim reservation', as advocated by the likes
of Syed Shahabuddin, is both unconstitutional and impossible.
Moreover, it wi l l strengthen the forces of Hindutva. Given this ,
he wonders if the demand for total Muslim reservation is not
ft conspiracy todeny what the backward and dalit Muslims indeed
deserve.
The next chapter - 'Haqeeqat', reality - presents exist ing
conditions and hardships faced by low-caste Muslim commu-
nities such as julaha (weavers), halalkhor, lalbegi (scavenger),
bhatiara, gorkan (grave diggers), bakkho, mirshikar.chik (butcher),
rangrez, darzi and nat. He shows how these castes are discrimi-
nated against and frowned upon in everyday life by the ashraf.
Such discrimination persists in mosques and even after one's
death. The detailed description of the pl ight of pamarias in a
pathan-dominated village of Bhojpur district is heart-rending.
Islam's slogan for equality notwithstanding, pamarias are not
allowed to bury their dead in the pathans graveyard. Methodo-
logically, this chapter is quite rich. It uses popular proverbs and
stereotypes about the so-called low-born Muslims and dissects
them with dazzling clarity.
In the following chapter - the longest of all - there is a
comprehensive history of Islam as an ideal and Islam as a lived
reality. The author says that though Islam does not recognise
hierarchy and differentiation based on birth, in practice it has
existed among Muslims, both in India and also in Arab lands.
Muslim 'ulema' and scholars have particularly legitimised tliis
hierarchy all throughout history. Among the former, he discusses
the writings of Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Maulana Ahmad Raza
Khan Brelvi (Chapter Four) and in the latter Ziauddin Barni, the
medieval historian. Ali thinks that Barni was almost like
'Musalman's Manu'. The author makes a sweeping jump from
the medieval to the modern era and discusses how British rule
badly affected the dis-privileged sections of society - weavers,
ansaris - especially. It was during this period - the first two
decades of the 20th century, to be precise - that the Momin
movement was born. It is not well known that this movement
never supported the Muslim League. Indeed, its leaders such as
Abdul Qaiyum Ansari, always opposed and debunked Jinnah's
two-nation theory. The author draws our attention to a striking
fact: both the Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League opposed
the enumeration of caste in the census arguing that it would
weaken the 'community'.
The fourth chapter - 'Virasat', heritage - deals with the ways
in which Muslim religious fora and government institutions
meant for Muslims in Bihar have been monopolised by the
Ashraf. The fora and inst i tut ions discussed in the chapter include
Imrarat-e-Sharia, Phulwari Sharif, Idar-e-Sharia, Patna, All India
Mi l l i Council, All India Musl im Personal Board, Urdu Academy,
Suuni Waqf Board, Minorities Commission, Madarsa Board, and
Urdu Advisory Council. In support of his argument the author
furnishes meticulously gathered secondary data that v iv idly depict
the absolute marginalisation of the groups at the bottom.
Titled as 'Pyar Nikah par Zaat ki Pahredaari' (Caste Surveil-
lance on Love Marriage), Chapter five is most interesting. It
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presents one case of unsuccessful and four cases of successful
inter-caste love marriage. Through these stories, Ali Anwar
intends to show how deeply entrenched is the caste feeling among
the Muslims of Bihar, particularly among the traditional elites.
He notes with a sense of irony that we all listen to the immortal
love stories of Sheerin-Farhad, Laila-Majnu and none of us
perhaps ask which caste they belonged to. In Bihar, however,
we do when it comes to inter-caste marriage.
From the open streets of love Anwar jumps to the closed
corridors of power in the next chapter - 'Seyasat', politics. The
crux -of this chapter is how and why backward Muslims have
been deliberately kept out of legislative assembly and government
services, IAS and IPS, and upper-caste Muslims promoted in their
place. This is tragic because most upper caste Muslims in pre-
independent India sided with the Muslim League and its two-
nation theory. The backward Muslims, under the leadership of
the Momin conference and Abdul Qaiyum, by contrast, firmly
stood for a united India. This historical fact apart, the Indian
National Congress in the post-1947 phase promoted erstwhile
Muslim League leaders at the expense of those who lent rock
solid support to the Congress. As a result, backward Muslims
never got their due, politically as well as economically, even
though they numerically form 80 per cent of the total Muslim
population. This situation has continued, says the author, even
during the regime of Laloo Prasad Yadav, the messiah of the
backward in Bihar. Anwar sharply criticises him for his refusal
to support the cause of Muslim backward castes in the same way
as he does for their counterparts among Hindus. He, however,
notes with a sense of satisfaction that the scenario is now changing
and there is a great social churning within Muslim society with
the solid assertion of the backward Muslims. And this augurs
well for the next century.
The penultimate chapter- 'Shakhsiat', personality - is devoted
to the political-social biographies of four members of the ansari-
dhuniya communities whom author describes as "source of in-
spiration" (p 205) - Maulana Ateequr Rahaman Arvi, Abdul
Qaiyum Ansari, Battakh Mian and Bismillah Khan. Ateequr
Rahman was an 'alim' by training and profession but he was
an open critic of the Muslim League. Because he believed that
Hindus and Muslims were one and that god did not differentiate
between them, the Muslim League disgustingly called him a
'Domwa Maulana' (p 208). Abdul Qaiyum Ansari was the architect
of the Momin conference in Bihar. Battak Mian, the least known
among the four, was the man who refused to poison Gandhi in
Champaran despite the offer of wealth by the British. Bismillah
Khan, as we know, is a l iving Bharat Ratna shahnai player. It
is not known that he was born into a poor backward family of
the present-day Baksar district.10
Debating the Issue
I can hardly disagree with what the author has said so far.
Undoubtedly this is a splendid book in social criticism and each
of us, certainly the students of sociology, should read it. It makes
the unseen glaringly visible; and the unconscious conscious. It
lifts the veil off the dark realities we seek to conceal. That said,
the book is also about several silences. I will discuss here only
three of them.
First, endogamy, the most agreed upon element of caste strati-
fication among Muslims! It is not sufficient to say, and this is
what the author does in several places, that ashraf do not marry
their daughters off to sons of ajlaf. It is equa l l y t rue that one
caste among ashraf generally does not have a mar i ta l a l l iance
with another caste even if it is ashraf. Likewise, a lower caste
such as dhuniya will rarely marry his son or daughter to a person
belonging to the lalbegi or nat caste. The point I wish to make
is that there is not one continuous, singular hierarchy that defines
castes among Muslims. Rather, hierarchy is multiple and each
caste is a discrete category. Put differently, the ashraf-ajlaf
dichotomous approach to understanding social stratification among
Muslims, though it is useful, is also extremely restricted in
unravelling many nuances. This approach privileges the ashraf
view of the caste system and fails to account for the view from
the bottom."
While interviewing low caste Muslims in Delhi for a Delhi
government project to assess if they should be included among
the OBCs,12 most of them narrated their respective stories of
the fall from grace. Invariably, each of the lower castes thai we
interviewed said that long ago they were indeed Shaikh and
enjoyed considerable economic prosperity. Gradually their status
began to dwindle. The chicanery by the so-called ashraf accen-
tuated the decline. And thus over a period they became what
they are today. For example, a leader of the ansaris in Salempur
area said their lineage went back to Aiyub. who welcomed
prophet Muhammad in Madina, and thus they were in no way
inferior to the ashraf who called themselves Siddiqi or Faruqi.
Be it noted that prophet Muhammad called Aiyub1-1 and others
who supported him in Madina as ansar and hence the caste title
Ansari. Similarly, a leader of the qureshis said their ancestry went
directly back to the tribe of prophet Muhammad and therefore
they were in no way inferior to the so-called 'sharif zaat'.
From the foregoing, it is more than evident that if we look
at the caste system from the perspective of the non-ashraf, we
notice that each caste has its own sense of being proud and
superior. Further, it is quite misleading to say that the so-called
ashraf always serves as the point of reference for all non-ashraf
castes. On the contrary, each caste has its own sense of pride
and differentiates itself from other castes without necessarily
considering it either inferior or superior. This seems to be working
mostly at the middle levels. When it comes to a relation between
two or more levels, one notices an extremely powerful notion
among each caste that there is at least one caste below and inferior
to it. Of many other reasons, this is perhaps the most important
one why endogamy persists even today. Otherwise, how can we
explain the opposition to marriage between a pathan boy and
a shaikh girl, as cited by the author himself (p 163), even though
both of them are ashraf? What is also strikingly absent from the
author's otherwise brilliant account is the mention of even a
single story of conflict over marriage, for instance, between an
ansari boy and a dafali or lalbegi girl. I assume there are possibly
several stories of this nature in a patriarchal, feudal society l ike
Bihar.
Second, Anwar does not give any significant weight to the
political economy of caste. On page 31 he says, "...Where casic
is decided on the basis of one's birth, change in economic position
does not alter the caste status." While making this argument. I
think, Anwar unconsciously falls in the very ashraf trap tha t he
seeks to overcome. The birth thesis is what ashraf would always
employ not to recognise the changed status of the ajlaf as it so
glaringly defies the belief (unexamined as always it is) of the
former. This is exactly the way racists in the US sought to muf t l c
the egalitarian voices of the blacks-a person born black remains
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1 1 This argument is modelled on that of Gupta (1993, 2001) as out l ined
in the case of the caste system among Hindus. My debt to him is thus
obvious.
12 This project was undertaken under the directorship of J S Gandhi of
JNU during 1998-1999. The fieldwork in Muslim-dominated areas was
carried out for 2 weeks and I worked as a member of the team.
13 To escape the pinching stigma, fashioned and perpetuated by the self-
proclaimed superior ashraf. many people from ansari caste have recently
begun to delete 'ansari' from their names and have instead added 'Aiyubi '
as suffix. It should be recalled that the title 'Aiyubi' is derived from
Aiyub Ansari who welcomed prophet Muhammad in Medina. Field note.
14 Howard Becker discusses the issue of race in a different context. The
reason why I invoke him here is that the underlying nature of arguments
appears to be almost similar in both contexts.
.15 In conversation with Abdul Waheed, March 18, 2001, Aligarh.
16 Ahmad (1973) touches upon this aspect. An in-depth study is s t i l l
wanting, however.
17 Stating the objective of his book. Dirks writes that he hopes to " weave
an argument far more complicated than that the British invented caste,
though in one sense this is precisely what happened" (2001:9).
18 Ghurye's explanation is worth noting here. He observes:
It is diff icult to see any valid public reason for this elaborate treatment
of caste in the census reports...The conclusion is unavoidable that the
intellectual curiosity of some of the early officials is mostly responsible
for the treatment of caste given to it in the census...The total result has
been, as we have seen, a livening-iip of caste spirit (1932:158, italics
mine).
19 There seems to be an unhindered continuity between the position of the
then Mahasabha and that of the present RSS pari var. Both RSS and BJP
simply deny caste identity. See Kanungo (2001:140-48) and Jafferlot
(2000).
20 It is surprising that Dirks does not deal with caste among Muslims. One
must acknowledge, however, that Dirks' book is immensely thought
provoking. It is ruthlessly br i l l i an t in establishing the intimate relations
between technologies of knowledge production and colonial power. So
is its powerful critique of the Cambridge school.
21 Anwar does not exactly use the term Jihad. To plead precisely this case,
Ejaz Ali , convener of the all-India Muslim Backward Morcha that has
the same cause as Anwar's, however, calls for a jihad. See his pamphlet
Jihad (undated).
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